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Abstract
In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, the Chinese government radically 
adjusted the regulatory framework of the domestic Rare Earth Elements (REEs) 
sector. This article investigates the reasons for regulatory adjustments and 
the impact on China's market power. The analysis of long-term REEs price 
and production trends illustrates four reasons for regulatory adjustments: 
the China discount, the need for industrial upgrading, growing domestic 
REEs demand and severe environmental pollution. The analysis of the ef-
fects of regulations shows that the restrictive trade regime has increased 
China's market power and ability to affect prices, which led to a redistribu-
tion of global welfare in favour of China. However, this market power is only 
temporary due to foreign countermeasures such as WTO-based allegations. 
Keywords: Chinese resource policy; Rare Earth Elements; reregulation; trade regime 
adjustments; WTO.
Introduction
Amongst the general public, there is an acceptance that the prices for pri-
mary commodities in general and exhaustible resources in particular are 
steadily rising. Empirical studies do not fully support this view, instead 
showing different periods of varying price trends for natural resources 
(Cuddington & Nuelle 2013; Slade 1982; Slade & Thille 1997). 
Historically, there have been at least six distinctive periods of gen-
eral price trends for natural resources (Bundesamt fuer Umwelt 2010).1 
From the beginning of the industrial revolution until the 1920s, prices 
increased slowly but steadily. In the period from the 1920s until 1970, 
the price curve for exhaustible resources took a u-shaped form due to 
ﬁrst decreasing prices at the end of the First World War and during the 
Great Depression, followed by rising prices due to high demand in the 
Second World War, technological progress and declining purities of ex-
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ploited resources. The subsequent period from 1970 to 1984 was marked 
by extremely volatile prices ﬂuctuations due to the ﬁrst and second oil 
shocks. Higher efﬁciency in the use of resources, the development of 
substitutes and economic structural change all caused a stagnation of 
resource prices between 1985 and 2000. The high and fast rising demand 
of rapidly developing countries, such as the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) and India, led to constantly and rapidly increasing prices in the 
period from 2000 until the beginning of the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC). During the GFC and its aftermath, resource prices experienced 
a sharp fall. In the current post crisis-period, a clearly observable price 
trend has not yet been identiﬁed.
Rare Earth Elements (REEs)2 prices underwent a contrasting devel-
opment. REEs are a group of 15 metals with the atomic numbers 57 
through 71, which form the lanthanide series. The metallic elements 
of Scandium and Yttrium do not belong to the lanthanide series but 
are incorporated in the REEs group in many studies because they have 
very similar physical-chemical properties (Humphries 2013;3 Hurst 
2010; Information Ofﬁce of the State Council 2012).4 REEs are called 
'technology metals' or 'seeds of technology' because of their steadily 
increasing use in commercial applications in the ﬁelds of new energy 
technologies, high-technological consumer goods, industrial and medi-
cal appliances and national defense (Humphries 2013). In the period 
of rapidly increasing overall resource prices, the prices of these metals 
consistently decreased due to high supply levels from Chinese mines. 
Despite providing over 90 per cent of the total world supply since the 
1990s the Chinese Rare Earth industry was not fully able to utilize its 
virtual monopoly. When prices for Rare Earth Minerals plunged dur-
ing the GFC in 2008, Inner Mongolia Baotou Steel Rare Earth Hi-Tech 
Co Ltd realized losses while having a global market share of 50 per 
cent. This situation has given signiﬁcant impetus for changes to the 
regulatory framework of the Chinese Rare Earth sector in order to 
raise the effective market power and REEs prices for the beneﬁt of the 
domestic industry.
This paper aims to analyze the reasons for adjustments in the regula-
tion of the Rare Earth industry in the PRC and its impact on REEs prices, 
market power and the global distribution of welfare. The remainder of 
the paper explores 1) the special characteristics of price formation for 
exhaustible resources based on the Ricardian approach and the Hotel-
ling rule; 2) the potential impact of regulatory framework adjustments 
on prices; 3) the pre-crisis trends in REEs production and prices, along 
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with the reregulation of the Chinese REEs industry in the wake of the 
GFC and its impact.
Theory of Pricing of Exhaustible Resources
Exhaustible resources are only available in ﬁnite stocks in nature and 
are thus absolute scarce. With ongoing exploitation and consumption, 
the scarcity of a speciﬁc non-renewable resource will rise over time, 
which leads to rising prices for the remaining stock of resources that 
are still unexploited in the ground. The neoclassical proposition that the 
optimal, welfare maximizing price for a good is equal to the marginal 
costs of production does not reﬂect the rising intertemporal scarcity and 
increasing shadow prices for unexploited resources in the ground. It 
is not applicable to absolute scarce and exhaustible resources (Perman 
et al. 2011). 
David Ricardo (1817) formulated an approach that involved rising 
resource prices based on increases in extraction costs. In his model, 
he assumes that resource mines have different extraction costs due 
to differences in deposit sizes and ore grade. The resource stock with 
the lowest extraction costs is exploited ﬁrst. Once this stock has been 
depleted or the total demand for the resource increases, the next mine 
with the second lowest extraction costs has to be developed, and so on. 
The increase of extraction costs leads to an increase of average costs 
for this resource and therefore to rising prices over time. According to 
Ricardo, the long-term supply curve for an exhaustible resource can be 
derived from the aggregation of costs and capacities of different mines. 
The course of this will only deviate in the case of the availability of new 
deposits with comparatively low extraction costs due to exploration and 
development, and extraction cost-reducing technological innovations 
(Ricardo 1817; Siebert 1985). However, the practical application of the 
Ricardian approach is difﬁcult, particularly because of insufﬁcient de-
tailed information about the speciﬁc extraction costs of resource deposits 
(Bundesamt fuer Umwelt 2010).
Harold Hotelling (1931) proposed a model for optimal price paths 
for exhaustible resources, which is built on the idea of intertemporal 
scarcity. The central tenet of his model is that there has to be a temporal 
difference for mine owners in the decision to extract one unit of a re-
source in period t or in period t plus one. If a mine owner extracts and 
sells one unit today, s/he has the opportunity to invest the revenue on 
the capital market. The Hotelling rule for temporal indifference is thus 
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an intertemporal efﬁciency condition that is satisﬁed when the market 
price for an exhaustible resource and the shadow price for remaining 
units in the ground increase at the discount rate. Mine owners with ac-
cess to perfect future markets are able to extract their deposits so that the 
price increases with the discount rate in order to maximize the present 
value of their deposit (Hotelling 1931; Solow 1974; Perman et al. 2011). 
Extraction costs, which are the main determinant of price developments 
in the Ricardian approach, play a minor role in Hotelling's model and 
are assumed to be constant. When extraction costs are increasing over 
time due to stock effects and deposit grade deterioration, initial prices 
are set higher but will grow less rapidly compared to the case of constant 
costs (Pindyck 1977).
Empirical assessments of the Hotelling rule neither fully conﬁrm nor 
reject it (Slade 1982; Slade & Thille 1997). The poor empirical perform-
ance of the model is explained by its strict assumptions. Hotelling as-
sumed a neoclassical framework without externalities or technological 
progress, with constant extraction costs, constant and known demand 
patterns, a perfect capital market, full information about the resource 
base and substitutes or backstop-technologies. Deviations from these 
underlying assumptions lead to major deviations of the real price path 
from the optimal price path (Solow 1974).
After consideration of the two models, it can be said that there is no 
single and simple approach to explain actual prices for exhaustible re-
sources. Rather, there has to be an array of factors determining prices. 
The price-affecting role of government policies, which is not included 
in the models of Ricardo or Hotelling, will be discussed in the follow-
ing section.
Regulation of Exhaustible Resources and its Impact on 
Prices
The regulatory policies of resource-producing countries can have direct or 
indirect impacts on resource prices. The ﬁrst ﬁeld of regulation illustrated 
here involves changes in the trade regime for non-renewable resources. 
Restrictive export instruments imposed on natural resources have been 
used since the period of mercantilism from the sixteenth to the eighteenth 
century, when French laws prohibited the exports of gold, which was 
used as the measurement of a country's wealth. However, these export 
controls were also used in other historical episodes, such as during the 
period of industrialization, the First and Second World Wars, and even 
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in the era of trade multilateralism in the GATT-period before the founda-
tion of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Ribeiro 2014). 
A possible ﬁrst goal of export restriction is to directly inﬂuence prices. 
Large economies with signiﬁcant market power are able to beneﬁt from 
imposing export duties on goods that they are producing and export-
ing as the main supplier. The optimal export tax that will maximize the 
domestic welfare is thereby given by the inverse demand elasticity. The 
price for the resource on the world market will rise, while the domestic 
price will decrease. This beneﬁts domestic consumers and disadvan-
tages foreign consumers. Producers will face exactly opposite effects. 
Domestic producers experience an overall decrease of product prices, 
which induces a reduction of their welfare, of their production and of 
their employment, while foreign producers will experience an increase 
of prices for their products, of their output and of their employment. The 
export tax imposing government will receive additional tax revenues. 
Overall, the aggregate welfare effects are positive for the producing 
country and negative for importing countries. The imposition of ex-
port duties is thus a redistribution of global and domestic income and 
a welfare shift from foreign countries to the large economy (Devarajan 
et al. 1996; WTO 2010). 
A second goal of restrictive trade regimes is tied to the dependency 
theory derived from the thesis of Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950), 
which argue that the terms of trade of primary commodity exporting 
countries will deteriorate over time because the prices of primary com-
modities are declining in relation to the prices of manufactured goods. 
Primary commodity exporting countries, which are mainly developing 
countries, have to diversify their economic structure and the structure of 
their exports to be able to develop. Restrictions of the trade in resources 
are used in this framework as part of the industrial policy with the goal 
to build up a manufacturing sector with downstream industries. Instead 
of exporting low-value added resources, the shift to the export of high-
value added manufactured products should be achieved. Export taxes 
and export quotas raise the availability of needed resources and decrease 
the prices for domestic resource-processing industries. 
The third goal of restrictive trade regimes is environmental protec-
tion and natural resource conservation. For this objective, quantitative 
restrictions are the most widely used measures to effectively limit the 
volume of traded resources. In the framework of GATT 1994/WTO, it 
is the only exception to the general prohibition of quantitative restric-
tions. Article XX of GATT 1994 justiﬁes export restrictions on natural 
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resources only when the restrictions actually result in a decrease of 
domestic resource production (Kim 2010). 
The second ﬁeld of regulation that affects prices on the global market 
is the regulation of domestic production. Instead of using export quotas, 
production quotas for speciﬁc exhaustible resources can be imposed with 
the goal to negatively inﬂuence the global and domestic availability in 
order to induce price increases. Taxes on the exploitation of resources 
also raise the price level of resources. Production quotas and resource 
taxes can also be used to reach environmental protection and natural 
resource conservation goals. As mentioned above, Article XX of GATT 
1994 justiﬁes export restrictions on natural resources under a constraint 
which is easier to achieve if restrictions on the domestic production are 
imposed at the same time (Kim 2010). If prices for exhaustible resources 
are suspected to be too low due to excessive production, the implemen-
tation of production licenses can reduce the number of producers and 
induce price increases. According to Hotelling (1931) and Stiglitz (1976), 
the annual rate of production will decrease with an increase of market 
concentration in the resource mining sector. The licensed producers 
exploit fewer units of resources at a higher price. As a side effect, the 
depletion point is postponed further into the future and the non-renew-
able resources are conserved for a longer time. 
The third and ﬁnal ﬁeld of regulation discussed in this article is envi-
ronmental regulation. In Hotelling's framework, externalities of resource 
production are nonexistent. Non-internalized social costs due to nega-
tive externalities related with resource extraction, such as water pollu-
tion or emissions of particulate matter, lead to market distortions and 
to lower prices and higher production than optimal. New and stricter 
environmental laws regarding emission level standards and production 
requirements might also induce an indirect price increase. Investment 
in abatement technology undertaken to comply with permitted emis-
sion standards is an additional cost driver that raises the average cost 
of extraction for all resource sources within the legal domain of the new 
law (Siebert 1990; Morgenstern et al. 2001). This leads to higher overall 
resource prices according to the Ricardian approach.
Global Trends of Production and Pricing of Rare Earth 
Elements until the Global Financial Crisis
The patterns of production and use of REEs have changed massively 
since the beginning of commercial exploitation for gas-mantle lamps in 
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1880. When the USA started to produce gas-mantle lamps in 1902, the 
required REEs were imported ﬁrst from Germany until the First World 
War, and then from India until REEs exports were embargoed in the 
course of India's independence. During this period, the usage of REEs 
had already shifted from mainly gas-mantle lamps to searchlights, mo-
tion-picture projectors and therapy-lamp carbons, in which REEs were 
used to enhance the intensity of light, and ﬂints used in cigarette lighters. 
The loss of India as the supplier of 80 per cent of the US demand for REEs 
could be compensated for the discovery, exploration and development 
of the Mine Pass deposit in California (Goldman 2014). Figure 1 shows 
the production of Rare Earth Oxides from 1960 to 2010 in metric tons.
FIGURE 1: Global Rare Earth Element production, 1960-2010
Source: USGS n.d. Global Rare Earth Oxide Production Trends5
 The period until the mid-1960s is often dubbed the 'Monazite period' 
because REEs were primarily produced from monazite deposits.6 From 
1965 to 1995, signiﬁcant amounts of REEs were mined from the bast-
naesite deposit in the Mountain Pass mine. At the climax of production, 
the USA did not only produce enough REEs to satisfy the domestic 
demand but was also able to supply one third of the demand in the 
rest of the world (Clagett 2013). The dominant positions of the USA 
in general and the Mountain Pass mine in particular were achieved 
through several factors. First, the ore grade of the Mountain Pass mine 
deposit was higher than in monazite deposits. This led to lower extrac-
tion costs. The preferred production in this mine is in line with the 
Ricardian approach (Humphries 2013). And second, the US government 
had actively supported the rise of the domestic REEs industry after the 
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Second World War. In 1947, the Ames Laboratory was established and 
was subsequently ﬁnancially supported by the governmental Atomic En-
ergy Commission with the goal to conduct research in REEs production 
and application technology. New technology was directly transferred 
to the private REEs sector and further basic research in the public and 
private sector was supported by supplying high-purity rare earths. The 
foundation of the Rare Earth Information Center in 1966, with the goal 
to further connect the domestic and international rare earth sectors by 
offering information and consultation, ﬁnally consolidated the roles of 
Ames Laboratory and the USA for the global REEs industry (Goldman 
2014). As seen in Figure 1, this dominant production position eroded 
from the second half of the 1980s and the PRC then became the major 
producer of REEs. Figure 2 illustrates the development of the REEs 
production of the PRC and its corresponding market share.
FIGURE 2: P.R.C. REE production and market share, 1984-2012
Source: Author's illustration based on data from USGS and own calculations7
With the beginning of political change and Deng Xiaoping's Open 
Door Policy, the global REEs community learned that the PRC pos-
sessed the largest REEs deposits with an estimated 36 million tons or 
50 per cent of the world's reserves. In 1984,8 the PRC produced 8,000 
metric tons of Rare Earth Oxides and had a share of just under 20 per 
cent of the global market. Both the amount of produced REEs and the 
market share increased rapidly and climaxed in the year 2010, in which 
the PRC had a global market share of 97.75 per cent. Since it has had 
a market share of over 90 per cent since 2002, China is said to have a 
virtual monopoly. 
This shift of the dominant position in the REEs production from the 
USA to the PRC is the result of shifting comparative advantages that 
were partly driven by US domestic factors. In 1968, the US governmen-
tal support for the Rare Earth Information Center was suspended, but 
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continued to provide information based on support from the private 
sector until 2002. After 1970, President Nixon initialized a paradigm 
change in environmental regulation and established the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), which introduced strict pollution standards 
that put economic pressure on companies in the rare earth sector. In 
combination with lawsuits and EPA investigations of environmental 
contamination, these regulations forced a range of REEs ﬁrms out of 
business (Goldman 2014). The Mountain Pass mine was also affected by 
stricter environmental regulations. Between 1984 and 1998, the pipeline 
system that connected the mine with evaporation ponds suffered 60 
spills of wastewater from the REEs extraction process that contained 
radiological and metallic constituents, which resulted in surface soil 
contamination (Ali 2014). This led to ﬁnes and costs for cleaning up the 
contaminated soil. In 2002, the Mountain Pass mine ran out of space 
to store its waste but was not permitted to build new storage. Because 
Molycorp, the company owning the Mountain Pass mine, was already 
under high competition pressure from the rising REEs industry in China 
at that point, it shut down completely (Morrison and Tang 2012).
The PRC ramped up the production of REEs between 1978 and 1989 
with annual production growth rates of 40 per cent (Humphries 2013). 
REEs exports were primarily used to acquire foreign currency and to 
establish strategic ties with Western countries with the aim of gaining 
access to advanced technology. Domestic consumption did not increase 
in line with the increased production, so over 70 per cent of REEs pro-
duction was produced solely for export until 2004. Beginning in 1985, 
the ad valorem tax of 16 per cent for REEs exports was fully rebated as 
a supportive measure (He 2014). The fast rising export levels induced 
a decline in global prices and put US and global REEs producers, as 
mentioned above, under serious economic pressure that they were 
ultimately unable to resist. The reestablishment of ofﬁcial diplomatic 
relations between the USA and the PRC in January 1979, the signing 
of a bilateral trade agreement in July 1979 and the provision of mutual 
most-favoured-nation treatment helped China to utilize low labour 
costs as one driver for comparative advantage in the REEs industry and 
therefore to boost exports. 
Low extraction costs are another driver of production advantages. 
Although the ion-adsorption clay deposits in the Jiangxi and Fujian 
provinces and other areas in South China, which are the main source for 
heavy rare earths,9 have very low ore grades of only 0.05-0.2 per cent, 
the exploitation is very economic because only low levels of investment 
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and technology are needed for exploitation of this category of deposit. 
The Bayan Obo deposit of Inner Mongolia Baotou Steel Rare Earth Hi-
Tech Co Ltd is the world largest REEs mine and has a low ore grade of 
just one per cent. Yet the exploitation is economic because REEs are only 
mined as a byproduct from iron ore extraction and are recovered from 
the tailings of the primary mining activities (Golev et al. 2014). Low or 
even missing standards for emissions and labour conditions further 
cemented the cost advantage. Until 2010, Chinese mines were almost 
completely unregulated with regard to environmental issues (Clagett 
2013). Last but not least, the shift of comparative advantage was also 
related to a shift in research and development activities. While private 
and public support of the Ames Laboratory declined in the USA, the 
PRC pushed domestic innovations in the ﬁeld of REEs production and 
application. Although domestic demand was still low, REEs were seen 
as a strategic resource for the development of domestic high-tech capaci-
ties and were included in the National High Technology Research and 
Development Program (Program 863) in 1986 and the Basic Research 
Program 973 in 1997. Furthermore, specialized research institutions 
such as the State Key Laboratory of Rare Earth Materials Chemistry and 
Applications were founded to conduct basic or applied research. As a 
result of supported research, the Journal of Rare Earth and China Rare Earth 
Information, which are the only two journals to focus on REEs globally, 
are Chinese run (Hurst 2010). According to a study from Fifarek et al. 
(2008) that is based on patent data as a measure of innovative perform-
ance, the offshoring and re-localization of the US REEs production have 
also induced a loss of innovative capacity so that the USA has lost its 
technology leadership in REEs technologies. The PRC has now not only 
successfully developed new technologies for extraction and reﬁning 
but has also overtaken the former role of the USA in high-tech end use 
applications like Neodymium permanent magnets, which are used in 
electric generators and electric motors.
To summarize, the global shift of production from the USA to the 
PRC was mainly driven by favourable conditions in China consisting 
of low extraction costs, low regulation costs, supportive trade policies 
and innovative superiority, which led to lower average costs of Chinese 
mines in line with the Ricardian approach. However, due to these lower 
average costs, the global prices were also low. Figure 3 shows the de-
velopment of real prices for Rare Earth Oxides based on 1998 US dollar 
ﬁgures for the years 1922 to 2009. The growth rates have been calculated 
using logarithmic differences. Yet, the graph does not illustrate a trend 
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FIGURE 3: Growth rates of REE real  prices, 1922-2009
Source: Author's calculation based on data from USGS 2014
of steadily rising prices as the application of the Hotelling or Ricardo 
models would assume. The price ﬂuctuations were extreme in the period 
from the beginning of the 1930s to the beginning of the 1940s. Yet, in the 
period after 1990, when the PRC gradually replaced the USA as major 
supplier and gained its virtual monopoly, price growth rates meandered 
around the zero line, nearly showing a real price stagnation.
This reﬂects the so-called 'China discount', which is deﬁned as 'lower 
prices that result from excessive and disordered exports and the economic 
and non-economic measures taken by importers to force down the prices' 
(Zhang et al. 2015: 82). Despite its high market share, China was not able 
to affect prices due to missing market power and low domestic industry 
concentration. The supportive policies led to the entry of a high number of 
small companies, which extracted excessively in deposits in South China 
in particularly, where essential investment and extraction costs are low 
(He 2014). When prices for Rare Earth Minerals further plunged during 
the GFC in 2008, Inner Mongolia Baotou Steel Rare Earth Hi-Tech Co 
Ltd realized losses of 60 Million Renminbi (RMB) while having a global 
market share of 50 per cent (Zhang 2013). The elimination of the China 
discount was the ﬁrst impetus for regulatory adjustments.
The real prices for industrial metals such as iron, zinc and copper grew 
especially from 1998 onwards due to the high demand of the PRC and 
India as emerging countries (Papp et al. 2008). The high prices for iron fur-
ther promoted the mining of REEs as by-product in the Bayan Obo mine. 
This implies, ceteris paribus, a deterioration of China's terms of trade. 
According to the dependency theory, China should implement industrial 
policies with the goal to develop a REEs dependent downstream sector 
that produces and exports high-value added goods. This article identiﬁes 
this as the second driver for changing the regulatory framework.
Another driver of regulatory adjustment is a change in the demand-
supply balance. From 2005 to 2010, domestic REEs demand increased 
with annual average rates of 11 per cent while the demand in the rest 
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of the world grew only with annual average rates of four per cent. 
The PRC is now the largest REEs consuming country in the world and 
needs a growing share of its production to satisfy domestic demand 
(Massari and Ruberti 2013). This is endangered by excessive extraction 
and exports. Based on a business-as-usual scenario for production rates 
and 2008 as the base year, some estimates suggest that the deposits in 
Bayan Obo and in South China could be depleted in 25 and ten years, 
respectively (Liu et al. 2013). Wang et al. (2015) estimates on the basis 
of the Generalized Weng Model, a curve-ﬁtting model for extraction 
forecasting, that Chinese production will peak in the next ten years and 
will then decrease rapidly. After the peak, China would be dependent 
on massive REEs imports to satisfy demand. Therefore, the third factor 
for regulatory adjustment is the need to reduce exports and secure REEs 
supply for the domestic market.
The fourth driver is the need to ﬁnally regulate REEs-related environ-
mental pollution, which is especially severe in villages near the Bayan 
Obo mine, where 'an increase in cases of cancer, respiratory diseases, 
dental loss, pollution of drinking water sources, with a radioactive risk 
of polluting the water of the Yellow River' (Massari & Ruberti 2013: 42) 
is observable. Emissions from REEs production do not only threaten 
the environment and human health but may also create non-internal-
ized social costs that lead to market distortions and higher than optimal 
production.
Reregulation in the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis
Reregulation is deﬁned as state involvement in the evolution of the mar-
ket with the goal of controlling the market through the reformulation 
of old rules and the creation of new ones in order to achieve state goals 
(He 2014). The REEs sector in the PRC was not completely unregulated 
before the GFC but governmental agencies have tried to consolidate the 
industry and put an end to excessive mining several times. While high 
exports of REEs were a governmental goal in the 1980s and 1990s,  sup-
ported by an effective export subsidy in the form of export tax rebates, 
companies needed to obtain licenses to be allowed to export. Production 
plans for three categories of REEs products and export quotas for rare 
earth products were imposed in 1990 and 1998 respectively, while the 
export of REEs for processing purposes was banned. In 1997, 1999 and 
2006, permits for new mining or other REEs projects were temporally put 
on hold. The Ministry of Land, which was responsible for issuing and 
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controlling production licenses, announced in 2004 that all unlicensed 
mines and operations would be shut down. Foreign direct investment 
in mining projects was also prohibited by the Chinese state but was en-
couraged in rare earth processing and downstream manufacturing Joint 
Ventures. With rising domestic demand, the tax rebates were abolished 
in 2005 and export duties of ten and 15 per cent were imposed one year 
later in order to hamper exports (He 2014). 
These sequences of reregulation had the clear goal to restrict exports 
and to consolidate the sector by production licensing and controls. Yet, 
they were not successful. The actual exports exceeded the ofﬁcial export 
quotas due to smuggling of REEs. When export data reported by the 
PRC is being compared with import data reported by REEs importing 
countries, the reported REEs imports of 2006, 2007 and 2008 were 35, 59 
and 36 per cent higher than the ofﬁcial exports in these years. Mines in 
South China are widely scattered across remote areas and are difﬁcult to 
control (Information Ofﬁce of the State Council 2012), so that they were 
often able to illegally continue extraction and exporting without gaining 
licenses. This is partly covered by local cadres who are dependent on 
the local REEs companies. The growth of the REEs industry has brought 
an increase of tax revenue, employment and local income, especially for 
provinces and regions that are economically underdeveloped. Because 
the Chinese cadre promotion system is based almost solely on economic 
development, the existing REEs sector as a major industry is being pro-
tected (Liu et al. 2013). Furthermore, local cadres acquire shares of local 
REEs companies in order to directly beneﬁt from mining activities and 
therefore breach their original control duties (He 2014). In summary, 
the efforts to reregulate the REEs sector before the GFC were not suc-
cessful because of diverging interests between the central government 
and local cadres, and the lack of power of the central government to 
enforce new regulations and laws.
After the mild attempts of reregulation before 2008, the urge for strong 
reregulation arose when the GFC affected China in 2008. The GFC dem-
onstrated the need to transform the economic model from export-led 
to consumption-led growth in order to reduce export dependency and 
promote the decoupling from foreign business cycles. REEs-depend-
ent, advanced downstream industries like the renewable energy sector 
were massively supported in the Chinese stimulus package. In order to 
protect REEs deposits from overexploitation and to ensure that REEs 
are rationally utilized, the Ministry for Land Resources issued the 
'Guidelines of National Mineral Resources 2008-2015', which stated that 
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exploration and production of exhaustible resources would be strictly 
controlled and overseen by the government. The issuance of new min-
ing licenses was also suspended until 2015 (Morrison & Tang 2012).10 
The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, which regulates 
the REEs industry as a whole, additionally drafted the 'Rare Earths 
Industry Development Plan 2009-2015', which was partly adopted and 
implemented. In order to put an end to illegal mining and smuggling, 
the government began a ﬁve-month long tour of supervising visits, 
which led to the closure of illegal mines and the arrest of mine operators 
(Seaman 2010).11 Furthermore, the regions with a REEs industry were 
grouped into three large mining districts with overall 11 sub-districts in 
order to tighten regulation and simplify management. The ﬁrst district is 
located in Inner Mongolia, where the Bayan Obo deposit is, the second 
district is in Sichuan in Southwest China and the third one includes the 
ion-adsorption clay deposits in South China. The accumulated annual 
production of all districts should be in the range of 12,000 to 15,000 tons 
of reﬁned metals, which is controlled by allocating production quotas 
(Schueler et al. 2011). These districts should also establish a pricing plat-
form for unifying prices. In 2011, the Ministry of Finance and the State 
Administration of Taxation issued a rise of the resource tax for mining 
from 0.5-3 RMB/ton to 60 RMB/ton for light REEs and 30 RMB/ton 
for heavy REEs (He 2014). In the same year, mergers and acquisitions 
in the REEs sector began to be promoted.
 The ﬁnal goal is to consolidate the industry into one large company 
per mining zone that vertically integrates the REEs activities of mining, 
separation and reﬁning. These conglomerates would then be under di-
rect control at the central governmental level. Local governments and 
local-government-controlled REEs ﬁrms are still heavily resisting these 
consolidation plans, so the enforcement of mergers and acquisitions is not 
assured (Biederman 2014; He 2014; Schueler et al. 2011). The consolida-
tion is supported by new environmental regulations from the Ministry 
of Environmental Protection, which formulated emissions and pollution 
standards in the 2011 guidelines 'Emission Standards of Pollutants from 
Rare Earth Industry'.12 Companies that do not comply with these stand-
ards will be closed down and their production quota will be allocated to 
other companies (He 2014). The Baotou Rare Earth Hi-Tech Industrial De-
velopment Zone in Inner Mongolia, which was established in 1992, began 
to implement preferential policies in order to attract foreign direct invest-
ment and to assist investors in research and development programmes 
and the commercialization of new products (Biederman 2014). 
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To summarize, the government of the PRC began to increase its con-
trol and to reregulate domestic production. These combined measures 
of consolidation, production quotas and elimination of illegal mining 
led to a consolidation of the industry into a highly concentrated sector 
where the central government is able to exercise market power through 
highly regulated state conglomerates. According to the Hotelling model, 
increased prices and decreased production would be the result.
The Chinese trade regime was concomitantly adjusted with the over-
all goal to export less REEs raw materials but more processed down-
stream products. Export licenses were reduced year after year. In 2006, 
47 Chinese REEs producers and trading companies and 12 REEs Joint 
Ventures were licensed to export REEs. This number was reduced to 
only 22 Chinese ﬁrms and 9 Joint Ventures in 2009 (Tse 2011). Figure 4 
shows the reduction of REEs export quotas in REEs equivalents from 
2000 to 2014. Although there has been an overall reduction since 2006, 
the adjustment from 2009 to 2010 was a hard cut. 
FIGURE 4: REE export quotas, 2000-2014
Source: Author's illustration based on data from Tse 2011 and Statista (2015)13
Although the PRC initiated several sequences of restrictive adjust-
ments to the trade regime since 2005, the restriction that ﬁrst attracted 
the attention of REEs importing countries was the export bans of 2010. 
After an incident related to the territorial dispute between the PRC and 
Japan regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, China banned REEs ex-
ports to Japan, which is the second largest REEs consuming country after 
China, for two months. Additionally, China had also banned exports to 
the European Union and the USA from 18 until 28 October 2010. While 
the ban was justiﬁed by the Chinese government as being the result 
of extensive industry inspections, the importing countries labelled it 
as economic warfare and a fall back towards mercantilism (Lackner & 
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McEwen-Fial 2011).14 This geopolitical event called into question the 
role of China as a reliable and secure source for REEs and also put its 
overall restrictive trade regime into the focus of Japan, the EU and the 
USA, which jointly ﬁled an ofﬁcial WTO complaint against China. The 
WTO case following this complaint ruled in favour of the three accusing 
countries and maintained that China would have to abolish its trade 
restrictions (European Commission 2014).15
Impact of Regulatory Adjustment on Pricing and Market 
Power
The export ban of 2010 had a major impact on short-term REEs prices. 
While REEs prices plunged in 2009 because of the global recession and 
a slump in demand, they skyrocketed in 2010 and rose even further in 
2011. The price for lanthanum oxide increased from 4.9 US$/kg to 22.4 
US$/kg in 2010 and ﬁnally to 104.1 US$/kg in 2011, for example. This 
21-fold increase was largely induced by a speculation bubble for REEs on 
the commodity markets. In 2012 and 2013, prices dropped again while 
being still higher than in 2008/2009 (Golev et al. 2014). The restrictive 
adjustments in the trade regime led to a signiﬁcant difference between 
Chinese domestic prices and global prices. When REEs prices climaxed 
in 2011, price differences were between 68.5 to 557.2 per cent for some 
REEs (Morrison & Tang 2012). According to Biedermann (2014), this dual 
pricing is perceived as a pressure on foreign companies to invest more 
in China, especially in high-tech sectors dependent on rare earths. As a 
result, 50 foreign companies are already operating in the Baotou Rare 
Earth Hi-Tech Industrial Development Zone in order to beneﬁt from 
price discounts on REEs and tax exemptions (Biedermann 2014). Zhang 
et al. (2015) conducted a price sensitive analysis for REEs prices on the 
Japanese and U.S. markets in order to measure the changes of actual 
Chinese market power from 2001 to 2010. They conclude that market 
power and price sensitivity have increased by 140.18 per cent on the 
U.S. and by 244.22 per cent on the Japanese market, respectively, after 
tightening export restrictions so that China was able to obtain pricing 
power that it had previously failed to utilize in spite of its large market 
share (Zhang et al. 2015).
Mueller et al. (2014) estimate the wealth effects of export quota an-
nouncements for listed companies in the REEs industry in both China 
and the USA. Wealth effects are hereby measured in the form of ab-
normal returns, which are calculated as the residuals of regressing the 
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individual companies' stock returns on the MSCI World index, which 
includes stocks from 23 developed markets and is commonly used as 
benchmark stock index. They came to the conclusion that extreme REEs 
price increases beneﬁted Chinese companies in the upstream part of the 
REEs supply chain but were unfavourable for REEs users manufacturing 
in the USA. However, this result is only applicable to the pre-WTO trial 
period. With the beginning of the WTO trial, three rather than two quota 
announcements were issued each year, which were favourable for global 
REEs users and non-Chinese REEs suppliers (Mueller et al. 2014). 
Pothen (2013) estimates the impact of REEs export restrictions on the 
Chinese market power and corresponding welfare effects by applying a 
dynamic partial equilibrium model. The business-as-usual simulation, 
which assumes export restrictions at the level of 2013, showed that China 
would be able to utilize its market power to affect prices until 2019. 
China's welfare gains are 1.4 billion US $ in this scenario, while the rest 
of the world would incur welfare losses of 1.96 US$. The end of Chi-
nese market power in this scenario would be the market entry of REEs 
suppliers outside of the PRC (Pothen 2013). The development of new 
mines, the re-opening of old mines like the Mountain Pass mine, which 
can be economically exploited again due to high REEs prices, research 
and development efforts to ﬁnd substitutes and recycling possibilities 
and the trade diversiﬁcation of REEs suppliers were all triggered by 
the Chinese adjustment of the trade regime (Seaman 2012).16 Although 
restrictive trade policies have increased Chinese market power and the 
ability to affect REEs prices, market power is never static. China's market 
power is already challenged by foreign REEs consuming countries and 
their countermeasures.
Conclusion
This article sought to analyze the reasons behind regulatory adjustments 
targeting the Rare Earth industry in the PRC and its impact on REEs 
prices, market power and global distribution of welfare. In order to 
reach this goal, a theoretical framework about the pricing of exhaustible 
resources and the impact of regulation on prices was introduced. The 
four reasons that can explain why the PRC adjusted its regulatory frame-
work for REEs domestic production as well as trade and environmental 
issues were 1) the China discount, which prevents China from utilizing 
its high market share for high market power, 2) the need to develop a 
high-value added REEs downstream industry due to the deterioration 
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of the terms of trade as a result of resource trading, 3) the necessity to 
satisfy domestic REEs demand and 4) the need to internalize and limit 
REEs-related environmental pollution. 
China implemented or tightened restrictive regulations for the domes-
tic industry by revising the issuance of mining permits, the allocation 
of production quotas and the promotion of industry consolidation, for 
the export of REEs by reducing export quotas, raising export taxes and 
reducing export licenses, and for REEs-related emissions by implement-
ing new environmental standards. The changes of the trade regime had 
an immediate impact on REEs prices and market power. With the help 
of export restrictions, China was able to temporarily eliminate the China 
discount, to gain market power, to affect prices and to skim off foreign 
welfare. In addition, increased foreign direct investment in REEs-related 
downstream industries is an early indicator that might show a ﬁrst suc-
cess on the way to upgrading the Chinese industrial structure. The effects 
of domestic consolidation could not be estimated because the process 
has just begun. Due to the WTO trial and other countermeasures that 
challenge the newly gained market power, this situation is short-lived. 
With the abolishment of the restrictive trade regime in 2015, the need to 
enforce the consolidation into central government-controlled conglomer-
ates and thus the pressure on local governments resisting consolidation 
will rise. If industry consolidation were to be achieved it could renew 
the market power that the PRC temporarily enjoyed.
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